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REGULATING CREATOR CONTRACTS
I. INTRODUCTION: THE DIGITAL SHIFT
Contracts lie at the heart of the regulatory system governing the creation and
dissemination of cultural products in two respects:
(i) The exclusive rights provided by copyright law only turn
into financial reward, and thus incentives to creators,
through a contract with a third party to exploit protected
material.
(ii) From a user perspective, purchases of protected material
may take the form of a licensing contract, governing
behaviour after the initial transaction.
The renewed interest in the relationship between copyright and contract law
can be traced quite precisely to the mid-1990s. There was a major technological
shift, with the rapid adoption of the World Wide Web as a consumer medium
(Netscape's Navigator browser was released in 1994). In parallel, the media and
entertainment sector experienced a wave of consolidation, with multinational
enterprises keen to hedge their bets in the rapid growth of Internet services (in
2000, AOL merged with Time Warner to create what was then the world's
largest media company).
In the new "private ordering of cyberspace," contracts played a major part,'
as there was a sudden question mark over who owned the rights to new digital
uses of existing works.2 Changing contractual practices began to cover these
new forms of exploitation, and (if permitted by the governing law) unforeseen
uses. Creators deride these new practices as "rights grabbing"; publishers and
producers characterise them as "due diligence." 3
The digital environment also changed the contractual relationship between
buyers and sellers. Traditionally, the producers and distributors of copyright
I See D.R. Johnson & D.G. Post, Law and Borders: The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 1 FIRST
MONDAY 1 (1996), http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view
Article/468/389) (proposing idea of cyberspace as a separate legal sphere with self-governing
communities as law-makers and law-enforcers).
2 See, e.g., Tasini v. New York Times, 533 U.S. 483 (2001); Robertson v. Thomson Corp,
[2006] 2 S.C.R. 363, 2006 SCC 43 (Can.) (examining this issue in the U.S. and Canadian Supreme
Courts).
3 Symposium COPYRIGHT, CONTRACT AND CREATIVITY held at Bournemouth University on
25 September 2009 [hereinafter Bournemouth Symposium], available at http://www.cippm.org.
uk/symposia/symposium-2009.html. The Symposium was organised as panels with experts from
professional organisations of journalists, illustrators, photographers, film directors, composers,
songwriters, and featured artists. It formed part of the evidence gathering process for the study
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COPYRIGHT AND CONTRACT LAW funded by the UK Strategic
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materials were not much concerned about the consumers' after-sale behaviour.
General principles relating to trading standards and the sale of goods applied.
Once a physical carrier was bought in good order, the relationship to the right
owner was severed-at least in the private sphere. A consumer could read,
play, modify, or even copy a work. The purchased book or record could also
be sold under the doctrines of "first-sale" (U.S.), or "exhaustion of rights"
(EU).4 In the digital world, the relationship between buyer and seller may
persist after the initial transaction, prescribing conditions of use that have no
source in copyright law.
This Article deals with contracting at the beginning of the value chain, i.e.,
contracts between creators and intermediaries, the first step in bringing a work
to the market. Since the Article is based on a study for the UK Strategic
Advisory Board for IP Policy (SABIP), the focus is on British and European
law, with other jurisdictions consulted primarily to assess the range of possible
regulatory options.
II. THE CONCEPTUAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COPYRIGHT LAW AND
COPYRIGHT CONTRACTS
Under the standard economic conception of property rights, it is copyright
law that allows contracts to be written: copyright law defines the characteristics
of the work and the property rights in the work-that is, the contract space.
According to the economic literature underpinning these arguments,
authors' livelihoods depend on copyright law in the following way: Copyright
structured as an exclusive property right gives authors something to sell to a
third party for exploitation. Income is then derived from the contract assigning
or licensing the copyright, typically to a publisher or producer. As Richard Watt
sums it up in his article in this journal issue: "[C]opyright itself is not an
incentive mechanism, but (assuming that it is enforced) it does allow an
incentive mechanism, namely contracts, to operate."5
A core methodological problem is how conceptually to distinguish the role
of statutory copyright in these contractual arrangements. Consider two simple
examples:
* The literary author: a typical contract may assign the
copyright in a work to a publisher, against an advance and a
royalty on copies sold.
4 In the EU, the underlying principle for exhaustion is ensuring the free movement of goods
and services; the discussion in the United States focuses on market failure. See Estelle Derclaye &
Marcella Favale, Regulating User Contracts: The State of the Art and a Research Agenda, 18 J. INTELL.
PROP. L. 65 (2010)
5 Richard Watt, Regulating User Contracts: Economic Theof of Copyright Contracts, 18 J. INTELL.
PROP. L. 173, 181 (2010).
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REGULATING CREATOR CONTRACTS
* The professional footballer: a typical contract may bind a
footballer exclusively to a club against a signing-on fee and
salary payments that depend on appearances and success.
The former is a copyright contract, the latter a contract not based on a right
defined by statute, yet their commercial features resemble each other. Under
various economic models (again, see Richard Watt's article), we would expect
copyright law to affect contracts, depending on time preferences (patience); risk
and risk aversion; outside and inside options; and the extent of asymmetric
information between the parties-but there is little evidence that this is
empirically the case.
What looks like a copyright advance plus royalties is, in the case of the
footballer, simply a contract. There is no Berne Convention for footballers.6
Would it have made a difference if footballers' performances were statutory
subject matter? Vice versa, could not the literary author's copyright contract be
conceptualised as a bilateral agreement? Without the existence of copyright, an
author may still be commissioned for delivery of a novel, just as a footballer is
paid to play football. Similarly, the author may contractually receive royalties,
just as the footballer may receive a bonus for winning a title, or making an
agreed number of appearances.
The point can be illustrated with a sophisticated early publishing agreement.
In 1794, Friedrich Schiller and publisher Johann Friedrich Cotta concluded a
contract for the Horen journal (one of the most important periodicals of the
German enlightenment). At that time, there was no statutory copyright law in
the jurisdiction where the publishing house Cottaische Buchbandlung was
established (the Southern German state of Wiritemberg), and unauthorised
reprints in other German language jurisdictions were common. The Horen
contract includes advances, royalties, options, and even a moral right type
clause.7 Clause (5) reserves the right of the author to make modifications.
Clause (8) provides that an essay submitted to the journal may not be re-printed
elsewhere until the end of four years after the publication in Horen. Clause (9)
secures an option to the publisher on all future writings of the contributors,
provided that they are not already contracted elsewhere. Clause (15) promises a
6 The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Sept. 9 1886:
revised July 24, 1971 and amended 1979; 1886 U.S.T. LEXIS 160, established the international
framework of exclusive rights for literary and artistic works. The latest version (Paris Act 1971,
amended Stockholm 1979) is incorporated in the 1994 WTO Agreement on Trade-related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Apr. 15, 1994 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33
I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement] (TRIPS incorporates Articles 1 through 21 of
the Berne Convention and the Appendix, with the exception of Article 6bis on "moral rights").
7 A facsimile and translation of the Horen contract is available on the digital archive: PluMARY
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royalty to the contributors of one third of profits on sales beyond 2000 copies.
Although this agreement looks uncannily like a copyright contract, it is simply a
bilateral agreement over the supply of a service (which we only now recognise as
the exploitation of a copyright work).
Another strand of literature suggests that an author may negotiate what a
publisher can or cannot do, but both author and publisher have little
contractual influence over the behaviour of competitors and consumers after
publication. Here copyright law matters. To return to the soccer analogy,
anybody may copy Ronaldo's step-over, but not the turn of phrase that is a
substantial part of a copyright work. And presumably, the effects of subsequent
copying are discounted in the price a publisher is prepared to pay for a work,
depending on "indirect appropriability."8
If the relationship between creator (author) and investor
(publisher/producer) with respect to duration, royalties, and options can be
negotiated as a bilateral legal relationship sans droit d'auteur, it is only by
conceptualising the further relationship of right holders to competitors and
consumers that the regulatory function of copyright statutes becomes visible.
In limiting competition, copyright statutes enable right owners to charge higher
prices. Empirically, it remains an open question if this translates into higher
earnings for the creator.9
III. CONTRACT BARGAINING AND THE DYNAMICS OF THE CULTURAL
INDUSTRIES
If "copyright law only lays down the rights of creators and performers, not
their conditions of work,"10 are there any methodologies for examining the
effects of copyright contracts? One promising approach may start from the
empirical phenomenon of artistic production and consider the professional lives
of authors. As authors need to make a living in order to be productive, it
should be possible to generate a taxonomy of possible sources of earnings (of
8 Under the concept of "indirect appropriability" developed by Stan Liebowitz, record
companies or journal publishers may be able to charge higher prices because of unauthorised
private copying. See S.J. Liebowitz, Copying and Indirect Appropiabilty, 93 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL
ECONOMY 5, 945-57 (1985). For further discussion, see R. Watt (ed.), Indirect Appropriability: 20
Years On, 2 REV. OF EcoN. RES. ON COPYRIGHT ISSUES 1 (2005).
9 The effects on authors' earnings from digital rights management systems (DRM) are even
harder to gauge. Some proponents of DRM technologies claim that by tailoring prices to the
customer's ability to pay, DRM protected markets become more efficient "The prescription,
then, is to so structure rights that they enable differential pricing, except where transaction costs
- the costs to copyright owners and users of locating and negotiating with each other - will
defeat the practice, as they presently would with book resales." Paul Goldstein, COPYRIGHT'S
HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOx 201 (Stanford Univ. Press, Rev. ed.
2003). Even if this proposition held, what would follow for the author's share of the surplus? See
J. Litman, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT (Prometheus, 2001).
10 Bournemouth Symposium (notes by Professor Ruth Towse), supra note 3.
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REGULATING CREATOR CONTRACTS
which copyright contracts will be only one!) that can be empirically captured for
each occupational group. However, there are very few studies that can be used
as a starting point for this exercise. It is part of artistic folklore that many
authors have lived at some stage of their career on the breadline, are holding
down second jobs, or are supported by members of their family. But is this
true? If so, does it hold equally for all occupations copyright law treats as
authorial in the sense of the Berne Convention: e.g., novelists, journalists,
photographers, composers, screen-writers, or architects? To what extent does it
apply to professions that are populated by non-Berne artists, such as musical
performers and actors (who are protected by related rights)," or television
format developers, sound engineers, set designers, or gourmet chefs (who may
have no statutory rights at all)?12
A. FOUR SOURCES OF EARNING
In an earlier paper,13 I have developed four categories under which the
earnings' portfolio of cultural professionals should be analysed for the purposes
of copyright policy:
1. Statuto Rght: Individually Negotiated Income. This type of income is likely
to be based on publishing or production contracts and poses conceptual
problems in identifying the effects of the underlying statutory right.
2. StatutoU Right: Collectivey Negotiated Income. This type of income is
collected and distributed via collecting societies, typically for secondary use of
protected subject matter that is difficult to monitor. These fees can often be
directly linked to regulatory intervention, such as a statutory licence or a licence
set in a copyright tribunal.
11 The most important international treaties for related or neighbouring rights are the Rome
Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting
Organisations International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of
Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations, adapted Oct. 26, 1971, reprinted in 1 Copyright L.
Rep. (CCH), the WTO TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, and the WIPO Performances and
Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17, 36 I.L.M. 76 (1997).
12 J. Loshin, How Magidans Protect Intellectual Propery Without Law, LAw & MAGIC: A
COLLECTION OF ESSAYS (Christine A. Corcos ed., Carolina Academic Press, 2007); E. Fauchart &
E. von Hippel, Norms Based Intellectual Property Systems: The Case of French Chefs, 19(2)
ORGANIZATION SCIENCE 187-201 (2008); D. Oliar & C. Sprigman, There's No Free Laugh: The
Emergence of Intellectual Propery Norms and the Transformation of Stand-Up Comedy, 94(8) VIRGINIA L.
REV. 178&4-1866 (2008); D. Oliar & C. Sprigman, From Corn to Norms: How IP Enttlements Afect
What Stand-Up Comedians Create, 95 VIRGINIA L. REv. IN BRIEF 57-66 (2009); P. Decherney, Gag
Orders: Comedy, Chapfin, & Copyright, MODERNISM AND COPYRIGHT (Paul Saint-Amour ed., 2009);
M. Kretschmer, S. Singh & J. Wardle, The Exploitaion of Television Formats, ESRC Resource
(http://www.tvformats.bournemou th.ac.uk).
13 Martin Kretschmer, Artists' Earnings and Copyrght: A Retiew of British and German Music IndustU
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3. Income from Artisic Achity: Non-StatutoU Subject Matter. This type of
income includes fees for live appearances (such as performances or readings),
grants, and teaching in the artist's field.
4. Income from Non-Artistic Sources. This category includes income from any
non-artistic "day time job," family support, capital income, and benefits derived
from the social security system.
Empirical data in these four categories are not easily available, unless
collected through a specifically designed questionnaire instrument. In addition,
there is a body of income, tax, and insurance data available from government
statistical sources that can be used to interpret the creative professions. A third
source of information is surveys of artists' labour markets conducted by cultural
economists. Finally, it is possible to make inferences on the likely balance of
incomes from the published distributions of copyright collecting societies.14
The next two sections summarise what we know empirically about the working
conditions of professional creators.
B. DISTRIBUTION OF EARNINGS: SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
A useful baseline for comparing the situation of creators is the earnings
profile of the working population as a whole. National statistics offices collect
such data. In the UK, the median, or midpoint, annual national wage in 2005
was L19,190 (about $35,000 at 2005 exchange rates). In other words, 50% of
the employed population earned £19,190 or less. In the U.S., the 2005 median
personal income for all individuals was $25,149.11
14 Collecting societies licence copyright works on behalf of rights holders for uses that are
difficult to contract individually. Most publish annual accounts, and there have been a number of
inquiries by competition authorities that yielded useful data (Performing Rights, MONOPOLIES AND
MERGERS COMISSION (HMSO, 1996)). The UK collective licensing bodies include: Authors
Licensing & Collecting Society (ALCS) - licenses secondary reproduction and audio-visual rights
in the literary and dramatic copyright area; Broadcasting Dataservices - licenses programme
listings; Christian Copyright Licensing International (CCLI) - licenses the reproduction of songs
and hymns; Copyright Licensing Agency (CLA) - licenses reprographic copying of literary works;
ComPact Collections - licenses cable re-transmission rights for films; Design and Artists
Copyright Society (DACS) - administers reproduction rights for visual artists; Educational
Recording Agency Ltd (ERA) - licenses recording off-air by educational establishments;
Filmbank and Motion Picture Licensing Corporation - licenses the showing of films in public;
MCPS - administers mechanical reproduction rights of composers, lyricists, publishers;
Newspaper Licensing Agency (NLA) - issues licences for copying of newspapers; Phonographic
Performance Limited (PPL) - licenses certain uses of copyright sound recording; Publishers
Licensing Society (PLS) - administers certain rights on behalf of publishers; PRS - administers
performing rights of composers, lyricists, publishers; Video Performance Limited (VPL) -
licenses certain uses of music video recordings. There are currently more than 150 collecting
societies acting for right holders in the EU. Europe's largest society is Germany's GEMA
(administering music performing and mechanical rights) with an annual turnover exceeding
6800m (Annual Report 2008).
15 The UK Office for National Statistics (ONS) conducts an Annual Survey of Hours and
148 [Vol. 18:141
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Two studies designed by this author surveyed 25,000 literary and audiovisual
writers in the UK and Germany in 2006,16 and 5,800 designers, fine artists,
illustrators, and photographers in the UK in 2010.17 The first study found that
the median self-employed income (from writing) of UK literary and audio-
visual professional writers18 was k12,330 (before tax) (about $23,000 at 2005
exchange rates). In Germany, it was C12,000 (before tax) (about $16,000 at
2005 exchange rates).
These findings are consistent with other studies of creators. Australian
cultural economist David Throsby has conducted a series of studies on the
economic circumstances of Australian artists over a period of twenty years. His
latest report Do You Realy Expect to be Paid? was published in 201019 on the basis
of a 2009 interview survey of 1,030 writers, visual artists, craft practitioners,
actors, directors, dancers, choreographers, and "community cultural
development workers" (of a total estimated population of 45,000 Australian
professional artists, defined as those "who operate at a level and standard of
work and with a degree of commitment appropriate to the norms of
professional practice within their artform"). He finds that half of Australian
artists (= median) earned $7,000 (before tax) (US $5,600) or less from their
principal artistic occupation, and $18,900 or less (before tax) from all art-related
sources (US $15,100).20
Apart from low median earnings, a second striking characteristic of creators'
income is the winner-take-all distribution of earnings. That is, while typical
Earnings (ASHE) based on a 1% sample of the PAYE tax register. The U.S. Census Bureau
surveys personal income for all individuals over the age of eighteen. The 2005 figures for those
age twenty-five or above were $32,140 (median), and for full time workers $39,336 (median).
Since the mean (average) of earnings tends to be skewed by the presence of high earners, the
median is the preferred measure for comparing earnings data.
16 Martin Kretschmer & Philip Hardwick, Authors' Earnings from Copynght and Non-copynght
Sources: A Suve of 25,000 British and German WIfiters, Bournemouth (CIPPM 2007), at http://
www.cippm.org.uk/alcs study.html.
17 Martin Kretschmer, Lionel Bently, Sukhpreet Singh & Elena Cooper (2011), Copynght
Contracts and Earnings of Visual Creators: A Survy of 5,800 British designers, fine artists, illustrators and
photographers (Bournemouth CIPPM 2001), at http://www.cippm.org.uk/publications/dacs-repor
t.html.
18 Professional writers for the purposes of the study were defined as those who allocate 50%
and more of their time to writing. This excludes occasional or amateur authors who may not be
the focus of copyright policy.
19 David Throsby and Anita Zednik (2010), Do You REALLY EXPECT To BE PAID? AN
EcoNONIC STUDY OF PROFESSIONAL ARTISTS, Australia Council (available at http://www.austral
iacouncil.gov.au/research/artists/reports-andpublications/artistcareers).
2 Numerous other studies using different methodologies arrive at similar findings. An
example from the U.S. is a web survey of 2,755 self-declared musicians conducted in 2004 by the
Pew Internet & American Life Project. It found that only 11% were "success stories" (defined as
musicians who spend thirty or more hours per week in music-related activities, and drawing 80%
or more of their income from these activities). M. Madden, ARTISTS, MUSICIANS AND THE
INTERNET 2 (Pew Research Center 2004).
1492010]
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incomes are low, the population of creators includes some unusually high
earners.
In the total population of UK employees, the bottom 50% earn about 20%
of the total income. The top 10% of earners earn about 20% of total income.21
This income distribution is reflected in a Gini coefficient of 0.36 (a fairly
common distribution for the developed world).22
Studies of the income of creators consistently show a more skewed
distribution of earnings.23  In the UK, the bottom 50% of
composers/songwriters earn less than 5% of total income; the bottom 50% of
literary authors earn under 10% of total income, the bottom 50% of visual
creators earn about 10% of total income. The top 10% receive a
disproportionately large share (visual creators: 45%; literary authors: 65%;
composers/songwriters: 80% of total income). The respective Gini coefficients
are: for visual creators 0.55, for literary authors 0.63, for
composers/songwriters 0.88.24
C. EARNINGS FROM COPYRIGHT AND NON-COPYRIGHT ACTIVITIES: SUMMARY
OF EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
The working conditions in cultural markets (characterised by very high
earners and low median income) pose a basic question about the sustainability
of creative lives: if the majority of authors and artists cannot live on the fees
derived from publishing or production contracts, how do they balance their
books?
In order to make progress on this question, it needs to be defined more
precisely who counts as a member of the population for which copyright
earnings should matter. Perhaps the relevant population should be reduced to
21 D. Bird, EMPLOYMENT EARNINGS AND PRODUCTIVITY DIVISION OF THE OFFICE FOR
NATIONAL STATISTICS, METHODOLOGY FOR THE 2004 ANNUAL SURVEY OF HOURS AND
EARNINGS (Office for Natural Statistics, 2004).
22 The Gini coefficient is a measure of inequality, calculated by plotting cumulative population
percentages against income percentages. A Gini coefficient of I means that one member of the
population earns all the income ("perfect concentration"). A Gini coefficient of 0 means that
every member of the population earns the same income ("perfect equality"). A large gap between
mean and median earnings will be reflected in a high Gini coefficient. The Economist reports from
OECD and Word Bank data that "America's Gini coefficient has risen from 0.34 in the 1980s to
0.38 in the mid-2000s. Germany's has risen from 0.26 to 0.3 and China's has jumped from 0.28
to 0.4" (Economist, 22 January 2011). For a detailed recent analysis of UK data, see POVERTY AND
INEQUALITY IN THE UK: 2009 (Institute of Fiscal Studies, 2009).
2 Kretschmer et al., supra notes 16-17. The 2007 report includes a literature review of
quantitative data about artists' labour markets (surveys of Austrian, Australian, British, German,
Finish, and U.S. artists, as well as an analysis of tax and insurance data compiled by government
departments).
24 No studies as yet have explained the reasons for these sectoral differences. One proposition
worth exploring is that the greater the presence in globalised English speaking markets, and the
less dependent on localised "live" activity, the more tilted earnings will be towards winners.
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those creators in each discipline who can live, or at least aim to earn a living
from their principal artistic activity. Conceptually, this may be defined by a
threshold amount of creative earnings, or a threshold amount of time allocated
to creative activity. From one perspective, copyright law could be said to be
designed only for best-sellers. From another perspective, the relevant
population for the formulation of copyright policy may be constituted by all
potential cultural workers from whose activity society would benefit.
There are only a small number of studies that have attempted to capture the
professional earnings profile of specific groups of creators at this level of detail.
The defined population relies on an element of sustained practice, expressed by
membership of a professional organisation,25 or allocation of the majority of
working time to the principal artistic activity.26 By focusing on professional
creators, these empirical studies tend to steer a middle way between aspirational
and best-selling perspectives.
Even if aspirational or occasional creators are excluded from the analysis,
noncopyright income remains important to writers and artists. Most
professional creators have earnings from another source (such as a second job,
capital income, or a partner).
David Throsby finds that, on average, Australian professional artists allocate
47% of their working time to the principal artistic occupation. 27 A study of
self-employed artists in Germany captures the contribution of artistic earnings
to household income. On average, German literary authors contribute 42%,
visual artists contribute 42%, musicians contribute 53%, and performing artists
contribute 67%.28
This author's studies of UK creators found that 44% of visual creators
(designers, fine artists, illustrators, photographers) earn all their income from
self-employed artistic sources. Thirty-five percent of visual creators and 60% of
literary authors had a second job.29
In many countries, the legislature has attempted to mitigate the volatility of
these labour markets by regulating copyright contracts. The following Part will
identify such interventions through a comparative review of provisions that
intervene in the contractual freedom of parties with the aim of improving the
financial position of authors.
25 Throsby & Zednik, supra note 20.
26 Kretschmer et al, supra notes 16-17.
27 Throsby & Zednik, supra note 20, at 121.
28 C. Dangel, M.-B. Piorkowsky & Th. Stamm, SELBSTSTANDIGE KONSTLERINNEN UND
KONSTLER IN DEUTSCHLAND - ZWISCHEN BROTLOSER KUNST AND FREIEM UNTERNEHMERTUM?
17 (Deutscher Kulturrat, 2006).
29 Kretschmer et al., supra notes 16-17.
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IV. THE REGULATION OF COPYRIGHT CONTRACTS
This comparative review of copyright contract laws will summarise a range
of regulatory options, survey the empirical evidence on their effects, and
identify the gaps in knowledge that need to be filled. The perspective is
empirical, rather than doctrinal. The characteristics of provisions regulating
contracts over the exploitation of copyright works will be examined under the
following headings:
* Ownership
* Specific contract formalities
* Scope of grant
* Rights to remuneration
* Effects on third parties
* Provisions relating to the revision and termination of
contracts
* General doctrine relating to unfair contracts
A. OWNERSHIP
Under the so-called "creator doctrine" (underlying the concept of literary
and artistic works in the Berne Convention), the initial owner of the copyright
in a work is the natural person who created it.30 However, in all countries
reviewed, there are certain ownership rules and assumptions for specific, more
entrepreneurial kinds of work, and for works created under employment.31
From an economic perspective, it is not initial ownership but transferability
that matters. It may be useful to briefly illustrate the UK position for works
created under employment, commissioned works, and moral rights. 32
1. Creation Under Empqyment. Under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act
of 1988, for works made "by an employee in the course of his employment, his
employer is the first owner."33 The language preserves earlier case law.
3 Berne Convention, supra note 6. Article 2 of the original 1886 Berne Convention referred to
authors and their successors in title (les avants cause). Since 1948 (Brussels Conference), Art. 2(4)
has included a less ambiguous reference to the effect that the protection of literary and artistic
works "shall operate for the benefit of the author and his legal representatives and assignees."
31 For related or neighbouring rights, national laws typically are silent on the question of first
ownership.
32 For the U.S., a good starting point is Robert P. Merges, The Law and Economics of Employee
Inventions, 13 HARVARD TECHNOLOGY L.J. 1 (1999). Merges identifies three common law rules
for employer ownership of inventions: (i) the employee was hired to invent, (ii) the invention was
within the responsibility of the job, (iii) the employers' resources were used.
33 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act of 1988 (c. 48) [hereinafter CDPA], amended 1y
Copyright and Related Rights Regulationl996, S.I. 1996/2967 (Eng.), § 11(2).
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In Stevenson Jordan v. MacDonald & Evans,M an employed accountant who
gave public lectures on budgetary controls could not be ordered to prepare
lectures. The employee owned the copyright. In Missing Link Software v. Maee,3 5
a programmer was employed to write programs of the disputed kind. The court
found the employer owned the program even though the program was
produced outside working hours on the employee's own equipment. In Noah v.
Shuba,36 a consultant created copyright material in the course of employment (in
this case by the National Health Service). Still, the court implied a term that the
employee owned the copyright because it was customary for the employee to
assign copyright to a publisher and collect royalties.
Indicators that inform assessment of employer ownership include the
contractual scope of employment, level of responsibility, creation during work
time, use of work resources (equipment) and the financial risks taken by the
employee.37 However, it is important to note that the default position on
employee ownership can be changed both by the employment contract and by
longstanding practice.
2. Commissioned Works. For commissioned work, the default ownership
remains with the creator. In Robin Ray v. Classic FM,38 a consultant produced a
database of recordings under commission for commercial radio station Classic
FM. An implied licence to Classic FM was inferred but not for subsequent
exploitation of the database abroad.
3. Moral Rights. Article 6bis of the Berne Convention, incorporated by the
1928 Rome revision, states:
Independently of the author's economic rights and even after the
transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim
authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation
or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to,
the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honour or
reputation.39
- [1953] 69 R.P.C. 10.
35 [1989] F.S.R. 361.
36 [1991] F.S.R. 14.
3 Lionel Bently, THE CREATORS' RIGHTS ALLIANCE, BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE:
THE PROBLEMS FACEING FREELANCE CREATORS IN THE UK MEDIA MARKETPLACE (Institute of
Employment Rights 2002), available at http://www.creatorsrights.org.uk/media/between.pdf.
38 [1998] F.S.R. 622.
39 Berne Convention, supra note 6, art. 6 bis. Under Berne Convention Article 5, "[t]he
enjoyment and the exercise of these rights shall not be subject to any formality." The UK
legislation arguably does not comply. When the United States acceded to Berne in 1988, it
claimed to meet its obligations under defamation and unfair competition provisions. See Jane C.
Ginsburg, Moral Rights in a Common Law System, ENTERTAINMENT L. REv. 121 (1990); Cyrill P.
Rigamonti, Deconstructing Moral Rights, 47 HARV. INT'L L.J. 353 (2006).
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These so-called "paternity" and "integrity" rights are also known as droit
moral from their roots in nineteen century French case law.40
The UK gave formal recognition to these rights with the Copyright, Designs
and Patents Act of 1988.41 The main provisions in question are the right to be
identified as author or director,42 and the right to object to derogatory
treatment.43 However, there are extensive exceptions" for computer programs,
newspapers, reference works, and works produced under employment. Moral
rights can be waived,45 on fail for lack of assertion.46
If moral rights could not be waived (and it is the intention of the Berne
provisions that they persist "after the transfer" of the economic rights), they
would have the effect of an automatic term written into any exploitation
contract. In most civil law countries (e.g., Belgium, France, Germany), moral
rights are inalienable.47
B. SPECIFIC CONTRACT FORMALITIES
Many countries regulate the formalities of copyright contracts. In the UK,
copyright is transmissible by assignment, by testamentary disposition, or by
operation of law, as personal or moveable property.48  However, an
"assignment of copyright is not effective unless it is in writing . . .. 49
Equitable assignments are possible only in very limited circumstances, for
example "if the Client needs in addition to the right to use the copyright works
the right to exclude the Contractor from using the work and the ability to
enforce the copyright against third parties."o
Requirements of form may offer an encouragement to negotiate. However,
the issues are similar for shrink-wrap, click-wrap, and browse-wrap licences
40 Laurent Pfister, L'AUTEUR, PROPRIETAIRE DE SON (EUVRF. LA FORMATION DU DROIT
D'AUTEUR DU XVIE SItCLE A LA LOI DE 1957 (these), Universite de Strasbourg (1999).




45 Id 87 ("[A]ny of those rights may be waived by instrument in writing.").
46 Id 77(1) (right to be identified "not infringed unless it has been asserted in accordance
with § 78").
47 Some countries also have non-Berne disclosure and retraction rights that derive from
personality interests, i.e., le drvit de divulgaion (France): right to decide whether at all, when, and
how to release a work to the public; le droit de repenir (France, Germany: Ricknfrecht, Italy, Spain):
right to withdraw a work from circulation.
48 CDPA, supra note 33, § 90(1).
49 Id. § 90(3). The rule can be traced back to the House of Lords decision in Jeffrevs v. Boosey,
[1854] 4 HLC 815. Similar provisions can be found in Belgium, France, Greece, Ireland,
Portugal, Spain, and the US, among others.
50 Griggs v. Evans, [2003] EWHC 2914 (Ch) (Doc Martens case) at 35, dfing Lightman, J., in
Robin Ray v. Classic FM, [1998] FSR 622 (the commissioner achieved equitable ownership of a
commissioned logo (artistic work) despite failure to obtain an assignment (legal title)).
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where non-negotiable terms are standard practice.5' According to Guibault and
Hugenholtz, 52 the copyright legislations of Austria, Denmark, Finland, and
Sweden contain no requirement of form, and thus appear to allow oral transfer
of rights.
C. SCOPE OF GRANT
Many civil law jurisdictions have either by statute or through case law
developed doctrine on the interpretation of copyright contracts. An example of
the statutory approach is Germany's Zweckiibertragungstheorie ("theory of the
purpose of grant") under which author contracts have to specify uses to which
a work is put.53 Uses not envisaged by the parties at the time of the contract
traditionally remained outside the scope of contract (i.e., the rights were
retained by the author). Under the new Urhebervertragsrecht of 2002, authors can
now transfer rights to yet unknown exploitations but subject to "equitable
participation" (angemessene Beteiligung).
Under the legislation of several European states (e.g., Belgium, France),
copyright contracts must specify the duration, place of exercise, and the amount
of remuneration for each of the rights transferred. 54
UK law does not have any special principles applying to the interpretation of
copyright contracts and recognises "global" assignments of rights (i.e., for all
jurisdictions and all uses). In line with general principles on the interpretation
of contract, copyright licences do not extend to uses not contemplated at the
time of the contract. Non-expressed licences can only be implied if necessary
to give business efficacy to the contract. For example, in Robin Ray v. Classic
FM,5 Ray's consultancy agreement for creating a database for use in the UK
did not imply a licence to exploit the database abroad, through deals with
foreign radio stations. Similarly, in Grisbrook v. MGN,6 Mirror Group
51 See Derclaye & Favale, supra note 4.
52 Lucie Guibault & P. Bernt Hugenholtz, STUDY ON THE CONDITIONS APPLICABLE TO
CONTRACTS RELATING TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 32 (Univ. of
Amsterdam Inst. for Infor. L. 2002).
53 See Urheberrechtsgesetz [hereinafter UrhG] [Copyright Act], Sept. 9, 1965 BGBl. I at 1273
(F.R.G.). Section 31(5) UrhG specifies:
If the types of use to which the exploitation right extends have not been
specifically designated when the right was granted, the scope of the exploitation
right shall be determined in accordance with the purpose envisaged in making
the grant. Appropriate factors to consider for the question of whether a right to
use is granted, is whether it concerns a simple or exclusive right to use, the
extent of the right to use and the right to prohibit, and what restrictions affect
the right to use.
5 A. Lucas-Schloetter, LES DROIT D'AUTEUR DES SALARIES EN EUROPE CONTINENTALE,
Institut de Recherche en Propri& Intellectuefle Henri-Desbois (2004).
5s [1998] F.S.R. 622.
56 [2009] EWHC 2520 (Ch); [2010] EWCA Civ 1399. In the High Court, Patten, L.J., said at
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Newspapers was held to infringe copyright in photographs supplied under a
licence for print publishing by marketing back editions containing these
photographs through a website.
Giuseppina D'Agostino argues from a review of 19t century case law that
UK courts resolved contractual ambiguities about copyright transfers and
licences mainly in favour of authors.57
In the United States and Canada, there has been high profile litigation
regarding the interpretation of contracts of freelance journalists. Did
assignments from the analogue era envisage the transfer of rights for digital
exploitation? In the case of Robertson v. Thomson,58 the Canadian Supreme
Court implied a permission for CD-ROM re-publication of articles by the
commissioning newspaper (but not database exploitation), and affirmed the
primacy of contract (thus allowing global assignments in the future). In Tasini v.
New York Times,59 again the newspaper had engaged free-lance journalists under
oral contracts that did not contemplate electronic publication. The U.S.
Supreme Court held that the New York Times could not license back issues of
the newspaper for inclusion in electronic databases such as LexisNexis. 60
D. RIGHTS TO REMUNERATION
A right to remuneration may either be introduced as a direct regulation of
contract terms, or through rights that will be exercised by collecting societies
(either voluntarily or by statute).
1. Collecting Societies. Copyright collecting societies are often seen as
operating for the benefit of right holders only. Where the transaction costs of
individual licensing are too high, it appears advantageous for copyright owners
to inject exclusive rights into a collective organisation that monitors use, issues
licenses, and distributes royalties to its members.61 As a collectively negotiated
income stream, royalty terms can also be more advantageous to authors than
might be achieved in individually negotiated markets. Almost inadvertently,
collective licensing may also turn out to deliver important user benefits. A
65: "any licence represents a derogation from or relaxation of the copyright owner's statutory
rights. It must therefore be for the defendant to justify (absent any express agreement) the basis
for extending the licence to cover what would be otherwise separate acts of infringement."
57 G. D'AGOSTINO, COPYRIGHT, CONTRACTS, CREATORS: NEW MEDIA, NEW RuLES, at chs. 4,
9 (Edward Elgar, ed. 2010).
5 15 CPR (4th) 147 (SCJ) (2001); 34 CPR (4th) 161 (Ont. CA) (2004); 2006 SCC 43: "Parties
are, have been, and will continue to be free, to alter by contract the rights established by the
Copyright Act." 25 Robertson SCC (at 58). See G. D'Agostino, Canada's Robertson Rung: Any
Practical Signilcance for Copyright Treatment of Freelance Authors?, 29 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 66
(2007).
59 533 U.S. 483, 121 S. Ct. 2381 (2001).60 Id
61 Jorge Alonso & Richard Watt, Efficient Distribution of Copyright Income, in THE EcoNOMICs OF
COPYRIGHT: DEVELOPMENTS IN RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS (W. Gordon & R. Watt eds., 2003).
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radio station, for example, gets easy access to the world repertoire of music;
libraries may offer generous dissemination arrangements.
In European countries, the regulatory strategy of creating statutory rights
that can only be exercised by collecting societies has taken hold since the 1965
German Urheberrecht law that introduced a claim to remuneration for
unauthorised private copying, compensated via a levy on copying media and
equipment.62 Several European Directives have created rights that can only be
exercised via collecting societies.63
The behaviour of collecting societies has been challenged under European
Competition Law64 since they are joint ventures creating a super-dominant
market position in at least two respects: towards users and right holders. The
Article 82 (now Art. 102 TFEU) case law on collecting societies falls into two
groups: abusive conduct towards members, and abusive conduct towards users.
These will be briefly summarised.
a. Members.
* Collecting societies cannot discriminate on grounds of
nationality.65
* There can be no preferential treatment for groups of
members, but threshold conditions to full membership, and
distribution variations according to genre and cultural value
have been tolerated.66
* There must be maximum freedom for members to decide
which repertoire to inject into collective administration.
However, collecting societies can insist on transfer of whole
groups of rights, and rights in future works if that is
indispensable to the operation of the society. 67
62 UrhG, supra note 53.
63 Council Directive 1992/100 (rental right), 1992 O.J. (L 346) (EEC); Council Directive
1993/83 (cable retransmission), 1993 O.J. (L 248) (EEC); Council Directive 2001/84 (droit de
suite), 2001 O.J. (L 272) (EC).
64 Articles 81 and 82 EC Treaty became Arts. 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of
the EU (which entered force on Dec. 1, 2009). For ease of reference, case law references to Arts.
81 and 82 are retained in this article.
65 Membership and collection cannot be restricted to domestic citizens or residents. GEMA I,
O.J. (L134/15), June 20, 1971; Phil Collins v. IMTRAT Handels-GmbH, 3 C.M.L.R. 773 (1993).
Foreign members (authors and publishers) cannot be excluded from participating in the
governance of a society, nor from socio-cultural benefits (GVL).
66 GEMA II, O.J. (L166/22), July 6, 1972. However, there is a recent policy trend requiring
that royalty distribution must match actual use as closely as possible (MMC on PRS report, supra
note 53). There is no case law yet to that effect.
67 A required blanket assignment of all present and future rights was ruled to be abusive in
BRT v. SABAM, [1974] E.C.R. 313. In GEMA I, O.J. (L134/15), the Commission identified
seven categories of rights members may assign separately: (1) public performance, (2)
broadcasting, (3) film performance, (4) mechanical reproduction, (5) film synchronisation, (6)
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* Right holders must be able to withdraw from membership,
and assign their repertoire elsewhere. Collecting societies can
insist on lengthy notice periods.68
* Collecting societies can limit the influence of members who
are economically dependent on users (e.g., if a publisher is
part of the same parent company as a record label).
However the least restrictive measure has to be adopted. 69
* There is no specific ECJ case law on the freedom (or
otherwise) of collecting societies to refuse the administration
of individual rights and right-holders. 70
* There is no ECJ case law on the legitimacy of socio-cultural
deductions.
b. Users.
* As a dominant undertaking, a collecting society cannot
refuse to license a user in its own territory without a
legitimate reason.71
* Refusal to license only part of the repertoire is acceptable if
necessary for the functioning of a society.72
video reproduction and performance, (7) new categories of right. The MMC on PRS report, supra
note 53, added for the UK the rights to live performances. A mandatory requirement to assign
on-line exploitation was held to be an unfair trading condition under Art. 82(a) (Banghalter &
Homem Christo v. SACEM, COMP/C2/37.219 (Aug. 6, 2002). Authors also must be able to
assign different groups of rights to different societies in different countries (Greenwich Film
Production, Paris v. SACEM, [1979] E.C.R. 3275, [19801 1 C.M.L.R. 629). However, collecting
societies can resist cherry-picking (for example, only having those rights assigned that are
expensive to administer).
68 In GEMA II, O.J. (L 166/22), the commission allowed a minimum membership term of
three years. Retaining the right for five years after a member's withdrawal is likely to be unfair
(SABAM, [1974] E.C.R. 313). In Cisac v. Commission, Case COM/C2/38.698 (July 16, 2008),
the Commission prohibited membership clauses, applied by twenty-three collecting societies, that
prevent an author from choosing or moving to another collecting society.
69 For example, conditions on the exercise of votes are acceptable; exclusions from
membership are not (GEMA I, O.J. (L134/15)). Restrictions can be imposed that strengthen a
society's negotiation power toward users (SABAM, [1974) E.C.R. 313 para. 9). In GEMA III,
O.J. (L94/12), Dec. 4, 1981, the Commission authorised the society statutes imposing uniform
effective rates of remuneration (thus preventing members from making payments to users).
70 The general Article 82 case law on refusal to supply applies (e.g., RTE & ITP v.
Commission, [1995] E.C.R. 1-743, [1995] 4 C.M.L.R. 586; ICI & Commercial Solvents v.
Commission, [1974] E.C.R. 223, [1974] 1 C.M.L.R. 309). Some national laws provide for a duty
to administer rights for all nationals or residents of EU and EEA states (e.g., the German law
regulating copyright societies-UrhG, supra note 53, §§ 6-17, Rechte und Pflichten der
Verwertungsgesellschaft [Rights and Obligations of the Collecting Society]).
71 There are no specific rulings on refusal to license with respect to collecting societies. Again,
the general Article 82 case law on refusal to supply applies (ICI, [1974] E.C.R. 223).
72 In the French Discothdques cases, the impracticability of setting up a monitoring system in
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* Excessive pricing of licences is abusive but hard to prove.73
* Price discrimination between large and small users has been
raised as an abusive trading condition, but the Court did not
rule on the point.74
* There is no ECJ case law on the nature, or lack of, an
appeals procedure making tariffs contestable.75
* Case law is awaited on the introduction of competition
between societies. 76
It appears that the European Courts accept trading conditions with respect
to collecting societies that would be considered abusive in many other contexts.
The main line of reasoning is a familiar principle of proportionality: restrictive
conditions are justified if they are required for the society to carry out its
activities on the necessary scale. However, there is no explication of the
function of collective administration beyond managing private interests. What
are the activities that are necessary? The ECJ has tolerated, not always
consistently, a number of practices relating to collective bargaining, licensing
conditions, and redistribution of royalties that can only be justified on social
and cultural policy grounds.
the foreign territory was deemed an acceptable reason. Lucazeau v. SACEM, [1989] E.C.R.
02811; Ministere Public v. Jean-Louis Tournier, [1989] E.C.R. 02521.
73 If tariffs in other member states are appreciably different, the collecting society needs "to
justify such a difference by reference to objective and relevant dissimilarities between copyright
management." LucaZeau [1989] E.C.R. 02811, at 33. Including a mechanical fee for public
performances in a discotheque is acceptable in the context of differences in national licensing
systems. Basset v. SACEM, [1987] ECR 1747, [1987] 3 CMLR 173.
74 In the French Discotheques cases, the appellants complained that large-scale users, such as
radio and TV broadcasters, obtained lower tariffs. LucaZeau, [1989] E.C.R. 02811; Ministere
Public v. Jean-Louis Tournier, [1989] E.C.R. 02521. Stamatoudi argues that the line of cases on
price discrimination looks at clients in competition with each other, not treating customers in
different situations in the same way. I.A. Stamatoudi, The European Court's Love-Hate Relationshi
nith Collecting Societies, 19(6) EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 289 (1997).
75 According to Advocate General Jacobs' opinion in Tournier, the fact that there was no
regulatory control of the price charged by a society is relevant. Germany and the UK are the only
EU countries with a formalised appeals procedure. For analysis of the jurisprudence of the UK
Copyright Tribunal, see W. Cornish & D. Llewelyn, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 13:54-58 (6th
ed. 2007); L. Bently & B. Sherman, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAw 299-301 (3d ed. 2009).
76 In CISAC v. Commission, Case COM/C2/38.698 (July 16, 2008), the Commission declared
territorial restrictions unlawful that prevent a collecting society from offering licences to
commercial users outside their domestic territory. It was found to be a concerted practice in
violation of Article 81 EC and Article 53 EEA, resulting in a strict segmentation of the market on
a national basis. Reciprocal representation contracts between collecting societies in effect make it
impossible for commercial users to obtain pan-European licences. The Commission Decision is
under Appeal to the General Court (formerly CFI). CISAC v. Commission, Case T-442/08. The
French Discoth~ques cases (Lucateau, Tournie) hinted at problems with SACEM's administrative
overheads due to lack of competition, but had left the issue to national regulation.
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2. General Entitlement to Equitable Remuneration. The German copyright
contract law of 2002 (Urhebervertragsrechl) introduced into the Copyright Act
(UrbeberrechtsgesetZ (UrhG)) a new general entitlement to equitable remuneration
(Section 32-angemessene Vergitung) from any copyright contract. Section 32 was
said to codify a long established principle in German copyright jurisprudence.77
Before 2002, a so-called bestseller clause (Bestseller-Paragraph) existed. It was
applied only in the very few cases where the courts held that the contractually
agreed remuneration was "strikingly disproportional" (in einem groben
Mifiverbdltnis, Section 36 UrhG pre-2002) to the publishers' profits. The 2002
amendment extended the scope of application of this principle considerably.
According to the parliamentary records, the new copyright contract law
attempted to "achieve contract parity."78 Authors who have received a non-
equitable remuneration (or no remuneration at all) are entitled to a retrospective
variation of their contracts up to a level that the courts regard as "common and
honest practice in the trade" (Section 32(2)-blicher-und redlicherweise) at the time
the contract was concluded.
Section 36 of the 2002 copyright contract law provides that collectively
negotiated tariffs are deemed to be equitable. However, up to 2009 it was only
the writers' professional body VS (Verband der Schrftsteller, a subsection of the
services union Vereinigte Dienstleistungsgewerkschaft VERDI) that succeeded in
reaching an agreement on recommended tariffs (Gemeinsame Vergiitungsregeln)
with a number of publishers in 2005.79
Greece imposes a minimum royalty for books sales (10% per 1,000 copies),
and repeat broadcasts (50% of original fee for first repeat).80 Other countries
have so-called bestseller clauses similar to the German model that are supposed
to ensure the participation of authors in disproportionate profits.
From an economic perspective, regulating the terms and conditions of
copyright contracts may not lead to higher payments for authors and artists.
Remuneration clauses within individual contracts are difficult to implement and
monitor, and residual ties generally increase the uncertainty of investment
decisions. There has been little systematic research comparing individually and
collectively negotiated contracts.8'
77 For decisions of BGH and Reichsgericht, see A. Wandtke & W. Bullinger,
PRAXISKOMMENTAR ZUM URHEBERRECHT (Beck 520, 2009). Many thanks to Dr. Friedemann
Kawohl for suggesting references on German copyright contract jurisprudence.
78 Ausgleich dergest&rten Vertragsparitdt. Bundestagsdrucksache 1416433, 2, available at http://dip2
1.bundestag.de/dip2l/btd/14/064/1406433.pdf.
79 Http://www.bmj.bund.de/enid/Urheberrecht/GemeinsameVerguetungsregeln-uf.html.
80 Greek Copyright Act of 1993. Articles 33-37 contain detailed remuneration rules
summarised in GUIBAULT & HUGEN4OLTZ, supra note 52, at 91.
81 Slovenia appears to be the only country that has a system of mandatory collective
administration for the "making available" right. It covers all online communications directed to
the public. However, in practice no effective yet collecting society appears to exist that may
administer the right. Maja Bogataj, Mandatory Collective Management for Making available in Slovenian
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The earnings data from studies summarised earlier in this Article indicate
that the distribution of payments from collecting societies is more skewed than
income from rights that are individually managed. For collecting society
income, the top 10% of writers receive about 60% (Germany) to 70% (UK) of
collecting society payments, while for total individual income from writing, the
top 10% of writers account for 50% (Germany) to 60% (UK) of total wealth.82
Under another economic perspective, membership in a collecting society
may be conceived of as being analogous to joining an insurance scheme.83
However, for risk mitigation, creators would need to agree to a "progressive"
re-distribution of wealth from higher to lower earners.
E. EFFECTS ON THIRD PARTIES
In Barker v. Sfickney, 84 the company to which copyright in Barker's book The
Theory and Practice of Heating and Ventilation had been transferred went into
liquidation. The copyright was sold to a third party (Stickney) who was found
not to be bound to pay the royalties to Barker that had been agreed to in the
original contract of assignment. The rule in Barker v. Sdckney is one instantiation
of the doctrine of privity of contract in English law, under which a third party
cannot be burdened by a contract to which it is not a party. This rule has
potentially severe consequences in an environment in which copyright
assignments, and subsequent transfers to third parties, have become common.85
Across the countries reviewed, there is some variation about the ability of
transferees to sell on, pledge, or secure acquired rights. Generally, consent of
the author is required, but often that will be given in the initial contract
assigning or licensing a work. The rule in Barker v. Stickney appears to be an
anomaly.
F. PROVISIONS RELATING TO THE REVISION AND TERMINATION OF
CONTRACTS
Common interventions by the courts include imposing duties on the
assignee to promote and exploit, and presumptions in the construction of
Copyright Act. A Mistake or an Opportunity?, in COMMUNIA: THE EUROPEAN THEMATIC NETWORK
ON THE DIGITAL PUBLIc DOMAIN (2009), http://www.communia-project.eu/node/319.
82 Kretschmer & Hardwick, supra note 16.
83 A. Snow & R. Watt, Risk Sharing and the Distribudon of Copyright Collective Income, 23-36, in L.N.
TAKEYAMA, W.J. GORDON & R. TOWSE, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ECONOMICS OF COPYRIGHT
(Edward Elgar ed., 2005).
- [1919] 1 K.B. 121 (CA).
85 John N. Adams, Barker v. Stickney Reiited, 1 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY QUARTERLY 113-
15 (1998). Mark Anderson proposes to make contractual obligations in intellectual property
assignments binding on subsequent owners. See Mark Anderson, Assignment and Royalties Don't
Mix, 4 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAcT. 283 (2009).
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contracts (for example, regarding uses unforeseen at the time of the contract, as
discussed above under Part IV.C).
1. Restraint of Trade. In the UK, a contract doctrine surfacing frequently in
copyright disputes is the principle that an agreement which unreasonably
restricts a person's ability to carry on his trade cannot be enforced. In Schroeder
Music Publishing Co. v. Macauly,86 an extended term binding a songwriter for ten
years without an obligation on the publisher to exploit was held by the House
of Lords to be "in restraint of trade."87
2. Term Reversion. Renewable terms that fall back to the author, or
reversionary terms, dramatically increase the bargaining power for authors of
works that are still in demand after the first term expired. Under the Statute of
Anne of 1710, copyright returned to the author after a term of fourteen years
who could then assign it again for one further term.88 There is little evidence
that much use was made of this provision. Authors continued to assign
copyright outright by a contract that included the second term.89 Until the 1976
Copyright Act, the United States followed this structure, with an initial
copyright term of twenty-eight years that could be renewed once. Under
Section 304(c) of the 1976 Copyright Act, a copyright owner (or his or her
heirs) can terminate all grants, licences, or transfers of rights (made prior to
1978) beginning on the fifty-sixth year after that assignment was made. For all
grants of rights after 1977, Congress introduced an inalienable termination right
for authors after a period of thirty-five years.90
86 [1974] 3 All. E.R. 616.
87 Id. Other "restraint of trade" cases include Zang Tumb Tuum (ZTI) v. Johnson (Frankie
Goes to Hollywood), [1993] E.M.L.R. 61; Panayiotou (George Michael) v. Sony Music
Entertainment, [1994] E.M.L.R. 2. In addition, contracts concluded under "undue influence" are
void. See O'Sullivan v. Management Agency, [1985] 3 All E.R. 351; Elton John v. James, [1991]
F.S.R. 397. The doctrines of "restraint of trade" and "undue influence" are both part of general
jurisprudence on unconscionable contracts.
88 An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the
Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, During the Times therein mentioned, 1710, 8 Anne, c.19.
PRIMARY SOURCES ON COPYRIGHT (1450-1900), eds. L. Bently & M. Kretschmer (http://www.
copyrighthistory.org). The last section reads: "Provided always that after the expiration of the
said term of fourteen years the sole right of printing or disposing of copies shall return to the
Authors thereof if they are then living for another Term of fourteen years." The original
parchment copy of the act shows that the section was tacked on as a late addition in the legislative
process. Deazley argues that the divided term was intended "to benefit the author and only the
author." Ronan Deazley, ON THE ORIGIN OF THE RIGHT TO CoPY 43 (Hart 2004).
89 The 1814 Act extended the term to twenty-eight years, renewable once, or life. The 1911
Copyright Act provided that under certain circumstances, copyrighted works granted to a third
party revert to the author's heirs, successors, or legal representatives twenty-five years after the
death of the author.
90 Termination notices can begin in 2003, with the earliest termination possible in 2013.
Transitional measures are too complex to summarise here. For an excellent guide through this
landscape, see L. Bently & J.C. Ginsburg, 'The Sole Rih. ... Shall Return to the Authors". Anglo-
American Authors' Reversion Rights fmm the Statute of Anne to Contemporary U.S. Copynght, 25
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1475 (2011). Bently & Ginsburg's 2011 paper is an excellent guide through
22
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol18/iss1/5
REGULATING CREATOR CONTRACTS
Under the Italian Copyright Act (Art. 122), publishing contracts are
restricted to ten years, after which the remainder of the term falls back to the
author. However, this is without prejudice to the rules governing employment
contracts and contracts for services. It is unclear what effect Article 122 has in
practice.
G. UNFAIR CONTRACTS
In the UK, the argument has been raised that the Unfair Contract Terms
Act 1977 (as amended October 1, 2003) should be made applicable to copyright
contracts.
Schedule 1 of Section 1(2)(c) does not extend its provisions to-
(c) any contract so far as it relates to the creation or transfer of a
right or interest in any patent, trade mark, copyright [or design
right], registered design, technical or commercial information or
other intellectual property, or relates to the termination of any
such right or interest;91
The reason for this exclusion is unclear, but, in any case, the language of the
Unfair Contracts Terms Act is intended to protect consumers and applies to
clauses in agreements that attempt to limit liability, not to terms that create,
transfer, or terminate an interest in intellectual property.
Thus, parties to a copyright contract have to rely on general contract
doctrine, which will not normally review agreements that are otherwise lawful
because they are lop-sided or "unfair." Derclaye and Favale's article in this
journal issue contains a fuller doctrinal analysis of contract limits. 92
V. INTERIM CONCLUSIONS
We have robust knowledge about creators' labour markets and earnings,
derived from government statistics (labour market data, tax, and insurance
audits) and several independent empirical studies: artists' occupational profiles
over time reveal self-employed, risky, often stuttering careers. Many more
creators attempt to embark on artistic careers than are able to sustain them
("oversupply"). Earnings from non-copyright, and even non-artistic, activities
are an important source of income for most creators. A small number of very
high earners earn a disproportionate share of total income ("winner-take-all").
For most other creators, "portfolio lives" are typical: about two thirds of
professional creators have earnings from other sources, including second jobs.
this landscape.
91 Unfair Contracts Terms Act, 1977, C. 50 Pt. 1 s.11 (Eng.).
92 Derclare & Favale, supra note 4, Part V.E.
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Overall, the income of creators is well below the national median income.
There are some variations by sector, but broadly the picture is consistent across
the developed world.
According to economic theory, copyright law will only have effects upon the
contracts that are written when those contracts lie on the boundaries of the
contractable space that copyright offers.93 However, we do not know where
these boundaries lie, and therefore the empirical role of copyright law in
remuneration remains uncertain. For example, the introduction of new rights
(such as the rental right, or the dmit de suite) does not automatically lead to
higher earnings. A gallery (droit de suite) or record company (rental right) may
simply pay the artist or performer a lower fee to allow for further earnings
arising from secondary usage.
Overall, it remains an open question whether there is a negative or positive
relationship between the strength of copyright protection and the total earnings
of creators. We also do not know if there is a negative or positive relationship
between the strength of copyright protection and the distribution of earnings of
creators. Although the orthodox economic theory of copyright law assumes
that there is a harmony of interests between creators and intermediaries (such as
publishers and producers), much of the attempted legal regulation of copyright
contracts assumes that the incentives of creators and intermediaries are not
aligned.
The contractual bargaining outcomes are tilted towards bestsellers. Creators
with a track record of success are able to negotiate contracts preserving their
interests. For most others, in particular new entrants to the entertainment
industries, assignments of rights are common. Part IV above identified a great
variety of provisions through which legislators and courts have attempted to
adjust contractual bargaining over copyright works. Yet, we know little about
their empirical effects.
The next and final Part makes proposals regarding how these gaps in our
knowledge about the interaction of copyright law and contract bargaining might
be addressed.
VI. RESEARCH GAPS
A. NORMATIVE AIMS OF CONTRACTUAL REGULATION
Research should be undertaken to analyse the aims of regulation. Why
should policy intervene in the bargain between creators and intermediaries?
Surprisingly, the brief for the UK government study on which this Article is
based was silent on this issue.94 There are obvious conflicts between the aims
93 See Watt, supra note 5.
94 See Bournemouth Symposium, supra note 3.
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of competition law, the aims of copyright law to provide an incentive by
excluding competition, the aims of droit d'auteur-inspired legislation to secure a
livelihood for creators and protect their personality, and general principles of
efficient contracting that may or may not conflict with other notions of fairness.
The regulation of contracts may also have to take note of fundamental rights
and freedoms (such as constitutional principles and human rights).
There are widespread assumptions about creators' interests and motivations
that are frequently used in the policy discourse. Empirical work suggests that
an incentive structure built on exclusive rights fails to motivate creators who
often attempt to sustain careers from artistic earnings well below the median
wage of comparable occupations. More robust evidence on creators' interests,
including the relative importance of desires to be credited and desires to
control, can only be gathered by primary research. Professional organisations
that speak on behalf of creators have an important role here, but typically they
are also subject to complex interdependencies with exploiters of copyright
works. Research would have to be truly independent.
Economists regard copyright law in terms of its "efficiency" effects in
providing an incentive to increase creative output rather than in terms of
equity.95  There may not be an inherent clash between these views but
economics has a much less developed view of fairness than of efficiency.
At the Bournemouth Symposium,96 panels of experts from professional
organisations of journalists, illustrators, photographers, film directors,
composers, songwriters, and performers/featured artists considered the
following contractual trends to be unfair:
* In the UK, creators are routinely required to waive their
moral rights in contracts.
* Creators are routinely required to sign contracts that assign
all their rights to the publisher or producer (meaning the
enterprise or organisation that publishes and distributes their
work), and cover every potential use in a blanket manner.
* Contracts for digital use are just bolted on to standard
"analogue" contracts and do not make provision for
additional payment. If creators do not comply, others are
found who will comply, especially young creators who need
to break in.
Policy makers need to know if this picture is empirically accurate, and on
which normative grounds they might want to intervene.
95 See Watt, supra note 5.
96 Bournemouth Symposium, supra note 3.
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B. EMPIRICAL EFFECTS OF KEY REGULATORY TOOLS
There is a considerable need for systematic studies into the empirical effects
of the key regulatory tools under discussion. However, these cannot be
researched directly without comparison to some other "counter-factual"
situation-hence the interest on the part of researchers in "with" and
"without," and "before and after" situations.97  Such studies have
methodological challenges, as laws are never the only parameter of change, and
possible differences may be explained by other causes (such as the economic
cycle, changes in taste, etc.).
Feasible studies focussing on differences between countries, or studies
capturing changes in the market before and after the introduction of new
legislation include the following.
1. Effects of Rules on First Ownership. In the UK, film directors have been
treated as authors only since July 1, 1994, when the 1993 EU Duration
Directive was implemented, harmonising the copyright term.98 Previously,
films were treated as entrepreneurial works.99 The first owner was the person
who undertook the arrangements necessary for making the film (typically the
producer).
The question of why this change should have made any difference at all
merits consideration, as the new right remains assignable. Yet it seems that a
participation in revenues from certain secondary uses (that is, uses that have not
been included in the primary exploitation contract with a producer or
broadcaster) was negotiated as a result of that change. Economic theory
predicts that primary producers would pay directors a lower fee to allow for
further earnings arising from secondary usage. The "pie" does not
automatically get bigger by creating new rights.10 There are also costs to the
system needed to administer these new rights, possibly reducing the "pie"
available for distribution. These are generic questions about the effects of new
rights that would greatly benefit from empirical research.
2. Effects of Rules on Moral Rights. Moral rights are distinct from copyright as
an economic (property) right in that they cannot be transferred or waived (at
least in most civil law countries). For example, in Germany, moral rights
(Persinlichkeitsrechte) are inalienable-in the UK, these rights can be waived. This
difference in implementation is reflected in German commercial practice, which
is more responsive to the author's non-economic rights. Moral rights disputes
9' Id.
98 CDPA, supra note 33, § 9(2)(ab) (statutory authors in the case of a film are the producer and
the principal director). The Term Harmonisation Directive was codified as Council Directive
2006/116/EC, 2006 O.J. (L 372) 12.
99 Copyright Act 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c.74 (1956) (U.K.), and CDPA 1988 before it was
amended.
10 Millie Taylor & Ruth Towse, The Value of Performers' Rights: An Economic Analysis, 20 MEDIA,
CULTURE & Soc'Y 631 (1998).
166 [Vol. 18:141
26
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol18/iss1/5
REGULATING CREATOR CONTRACTS
(mainly relating to being credited as the author) are more than twice as likely in
Germany (24.6% of professional German writers have had such a dispute,
compared to 11.4% of professional UK writers), but the data is not conclusive
on any effects on authors' earnings compared to the UK.o1
Did the introduction of moral rights in 1988 in the UK cause any change in
contractual practices? 102  As discussed above, in the UK, the right to be
identified as author or director has to be asserted,10 3 and both (paternity and
integrity) rights can be waived by way of agreement in writing.104 It is believed
that contractual waivers of moral rights are inserted as a matter of routine in
contracts for audio-visual works.
If made unwaivable, moral rights may improve the author's bargaining
power. Alternatively, they could be seen as introducing inefficiencies similar to
other limits on contractual freedom. An empirical study of attribution practices
in certain media sectors is certainly feasible, using samples of publications over
time. It should be possible to apply models about the economic effects of
attribution developed in the economics of trademarks to the copyright
environment.105
3. Efects of Rghts to Remuneration. As discussed in Part IV above,
entitlements to remuneration can be introduced via collective management
schemes or contractual regulation. The German copyright contract law
(Urhebervertragsrech) of 2002 introduced a new general entitlement to equitable
remuneration from any copyright contract (with the express purpose of re-
balancing the bargain between creators and intermediaries).10 6 The German
legislation is the most far-reaching recent attempt at regulating author contracts
directly and would benefit from research from a comparative perspective.
Questions may include: Did the introduction of these changes have any effects
101 See Kretschmer & Hardwick, supra note 16, at 31. Other findings include that about 43% of
professional UK authors have succeeded in changing the terms of a contract offered in 2005,
compared to 44% in Germany. In both countries, only about 65% of professional authors take
professional advice before signing a publishing or production contract. In both countries,
authors who have engaged in disputes with their publishers or producers tend to earn significantly
more than their more compliant colleagues. This is likely to be a two way relationship: publishers
or producers may only listen to authors with bargaining power-but equally engaging in
bargaining may increase the author's bargaining power.
102 CDPA, supra note 33, %§ 77-79 (right to be identified as author or director (paternity right)),
%5 80-83 (right to object to derogatory treatment (integrity right)).
103 Id. 78.
104 Id. 87.
105 Since incomplete information (or informational asymmetry between buyers and sellers)
about product quality is a form of market failure, any improvement in the provision of
information could potentially enhance efficiency. William Landes & Richard Posner, The
Economics of Trademark Law, in THE ECoNOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 166
(2003).
106 UrhG, supra note 41, § 32, Angemessene Vergiitung [equitable remuneration]. Section 36
provides that collectively negotiated tariffs are deemed to be equitable.
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on the remuneration of authors? Why is it that only one tariff had been
collectively agreed upon in Germany between 2003 and 2009? There are
important issues surrounding the role of the institutional framework of
collective bargaining that might be applicable to other countries.
It would be possible to study, both theoretically and empirically, the kinds of
situations in which outright sale appears to hold more promise as an efficient
mechanism than rental-type contracts. As Richard Watt argues, if the empirical
analysis does point to the prominence of rental arrangements, whereas the
theoretical analysis suggests outright sale, then the reasons for such a divergence
should be addressed.
4. Effects of Term Reversion. Theoretically, reversing assigned rights to the
author (after a fixed period, or because of non-exploitation) would be an
effective way of improving the earnings of authors from works that are still in
demand after reversion. Term reversion should also have access benefits to
users in opening up archives of back-catalogues. 107 Something similar to term
reversion has re-surfaced as a regulatory tool in the proposed European
Directive, extending the copyright term for sound recordings. 10 Unfortunately,
107 Creators recovering the term will have an interest to re-disseminate works that are no longer
exploited (e.g., out-of-print). There is a potential overlap between legal techniques used for term
reversion, and registration or collective management schemes advocated in the orphan works
discussion. Cf U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS (submitted to the Senate
Judiciary Committee on Jan. 31, 2006) and Green Paper: Copyrght in the Knowledge Economy, COM
(2008) 466/3 final. THE NEW RENAISSANCE, REPORT OF THE COMITE DES SAGES (commissioned
by Neelie Kroes, Vice President of the European Commission for the Digital Agenda, and
Androulla Vassiliou, Commissioner for Education and Culture), Brussels, January 2011.
108 Amending Directive 2006/116/EC, 2006 OJ. (L 372) 12 of the European Parliament and of
the Council on the term of protection of copyright and certain related rights (proposed by
Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending Directive
2006/116/EC on the Term of Protection of Copyright and Certain Related Rights, COM (2008) 464/3
final), Article 10a (Transitional measures relating to the transposition of directive), subsection (6):
If, after the moment at which, by virtue of Article 3 (1) and (2) in their version
before amendment, the performer and the phonogram producer would be no
longer protected in regard of, respectively, the fixation of the performance and
the phonogram, the phonogram producer ceases to offer copies of the
phonogram for sale in sufficient quantity or to make it available to the public, by
wire or wireless means, in such a way that members of the public may access
them from a place and at a time individually chosen by them, the performer may
terminate the contract on transfer or assignment. Where a phonogram contains
the fixation of the performances of a plurality of performers, they may terminate
their contracts on transfer or assignment only jointly. If the contract on transfer
or assignment is terminated pursuant to sentences 1 or 2, the rights of the
phonogram producer in the phonogram shall expire.
The renewed interest in bringing non-exploited works to the market is also reflected in an
amendment to the UK Digital Economy bill tabled by Conservative Peer Lord Lucas that
proposes a compulsory licence if a work is not available in all common current electronic formats
in all geographical regions within two years after first publication, or if it has not been published
five years after its creation. Proposed Amendments of the Digital Economy Bill, House of Lords
(Jan. 6, 2010): http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/1d200910/ldbills/001 /amend/m1001 -
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there appears to be no live example of a functioning reversionary term regime.
Publishers and producers appear to find contractual means around possible
reversion.
It would be desirable to conduct both doctrinal studies on the implications
of term reversion in the current framework of international and European law
and historical studies on the empirical effects of past regimes.
5. Effects of RegulatoU Authority Over Copyright Contracts. Where overreaching
licence agreements are prevalent, competition concerns can be addressed
through regulatory intervention, including pressures to find self-regulatory
solutions, such as the use of model licences and codes of conduct. 0 9 Concerns
have been voiced that standard agreements (for example, those recommended
by unions or professional bodies) may be in violation of competition law,
specifically the prohibition against anti-competitive agreements and concerted
practices." 0
The only UK body charged with reviewing copyright contracts is the
Copyright Tribunal. It has a very narrow mandate, covering dispute resolution
of certain collective licensing schemes."' It has been estimated that the costs of
a referral and full adjudication proceedings amounts to at least £250,000.112
There are models for reviewing tariffs, contractual terms, and industry
practices in other areas of public policy, such as the regulation of utilities.113
ire.htm.
109 See European Commission Green Paper on Copynght in the Knowledge Economy, COM (2008) 466/3
Final (July 16, 2008); AUSTRALAN GOVERNMENT, COPYRIGHT LAW REVIEW COMMITTEE,
COPYRIGHT AND CONTRACT REPORT (2002), available at http://www.ag.gov.au/wwv/agd/agd.
nsf/Page/CopyrightCopyrightLawReviewCommitteeCLRCReportsCopyrightandContract_C
opyrightandContract; Nic Garnett, AUTOMATED RIGHTS MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS AND
COPYRIGHT LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS, A REPORT FOR THE WIPO-STANDING COMMITTEE
ON COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS, Fourteenth Session, Geneva, May 1-5 (2006); P. Bemt
Hugenholtz & Ruth Okediji, OPEN SOCIETY INSTITUTE, CONCEIVING AN INTERNATIONAL
INSTRUMENT ON LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS TO COPYRIGHT (2008), available at http://www.
ivir.nl/staff/hugenholtz.html.
110 Art. 81, EC, Art. 101, Treaty on the Functioning of the EU. In Albany International and
Brengens, the ECJ ruled that agreements on compulsory pension schemes fall outside the scope of
Article 81. Albany International BV v. Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie, [1999]
E.C.R. 1-5751, [2000] 4 C.M.L.R. 446; Brentjens v. SBVHB, [1999] E.C.R. 1-6025, [2000] 4
C.M.L.R. 566. Advocate General Jacobs' opinion in Albany laid down four conditions for
disapplying Art. 81: the collective bargaining agreement (i) must have been made as part of
normal collective bargaining; (ii) must have been made in good faith, rather than to conceal anti-
competitive restrictions; (iii) must have dealt with core aspects of collective bargaining, such as
wages or other conditions of work; and (iv) must not have affected third parties.
I" The Tribunal's jurisdiction is defined in the CDPA, supra note 33, § 149, § 205(B), and
Schedule 6. Some matters may be referred to the Tribunal by the Secretary of State even though
collecting societies are not involved. For example, it can settle disputes between publishers of
television programme listings and broadcasters over royalties payable.
112 Responses to UKIPO consultation on Reform of Copyright Tribunal Rules, UKIPO
Workshop (April 9, 2009) (notes on file with the author).
113 The UK Utilities Contracts Regulations 2006, S.I. 2006/6, define services as utilities under
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Here, regulation involves issues of market access, price control, and contractual
supervision. Research may analyse the available instruments as applicable to the
regulation of information markets and copyright contracts. 114
C. CONTRACTING FOR DIGITAL SERVICES
Digitisation appears to have a systemic effect on contracting. Digital
services may require complex supply and demand side contracting, often
simultaneously, with creators, producers, and users. Often, they will also
involve some form of collective licensing. There has been a proliferation of
new commercial arrangements. Private ordering appears well ahead of policy
here. Examples include offering equity stakes in new services that are
potentially infringing to major right holders (YouTube, Spotify). This avoids
potential liability, but reports suggest that very little money from such services
flows back to the smaller producers and creators.' 5 Other sensitive licensing
issues surround digitisation initiatives (such as the Google books project),
information aggregators, the treatment of user generated content on social
networking sites, and the obligations of Internet Service Providers.
Following a flurry of initiatives by the European Commission," 6 there is
also a process of reorganisation of collecting societies under way, through the
private ordering device of joint ventures."7 Again, the implications for creators,
smaller intermediaries, and users have not been systematically explored.
the following categories: water, electricity, gas, heat, exploration, and exploitation of oil and gas,
coal and other solid fuels and transport. Airport and postal services are subject to related
regulatory constraints, as is the communications sector, regulated in the UK by OFCOM under
the Communications Act 2003 (covering TV and radio, fixed line telecoms, mobiles, and
airwaves).
114 The Digital Britain report, DEPARTMENT FOR BUSINESS INNOVATION & SKILLS, DIGITAL
BRITAIN REPORT (2009), available at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.c
ulture.gov.uk/images/publications/digitalbritain-finalreport-junO9.pdf, explicitly likens the digital
information infrastructure to a utility, and proposes regulatory measures to curb copyright
infringements in broadband networks. However, the debate has so far omitted analysis of the
economic rationales for non-judicial intervention.
115 Consumer Focus, Response to the Creative Content Reflection Document, http://ec.europa.eu/avpo
licy/docs/otheractions/col_2009/assoc/consumerfocus-en.pdf (2010) (giving examples of
situations where this has been the case).
116 European Commission, Commission Communication - Management of Copyrnght and Related Rights
in the Internal Market COM (2004) 261; European Commission, Staff Working Document - Study on a
Community Initiative on the Cross-Border Collective Management of Copynght, Brussels, July 7, 2005;
European Commission, Commission Recommendation - On the Collective Cross-border Management of
Copyright and Related R;ghts for Lgitmate Online Music Services, 2005/737, 2005 O.J. (L 276/54)
(EEC). Publication of a proposed Directive regulating pan-European licensing and the
governance of collecting societies has been announced for Summer 2011.
117 Examples include Armonia, a one-stop-shop licensing platform for online and mobile use of
the repertoires of the collecting societies of Spain (SGAE), France (SACEM) and Italy (SIAE),
and CELAS, a joint venture between the German collecting society GEMA and the UK's MCPS-
PRS for the European-wide administration of the repertoire of EMI Music Publishing for online
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There are several methodological approaches that could be pursued here.
Theoretical economic research could consider the degree to which contracts
can substitute for copyright protection at all points along the value chain. 8
Developing digital services could be researched using social science perspectives
on private ordering, from a strategic management perspective on business
models, or from a consumer perspective (acceptability of levels of payment and
various levels of copy restrictions).
A starting point would be an observation of emerging contractual
arrangements over time. There have been some limited reviews of collecting
societies (mostly in the EU) from a legal perspective. These studies compile the
rights managed collectively in each country, whether they are administered
voluntarily or on a statutory basis, and what regulatory supervision (if any) is in
place.
There have been no studies that take an approach based primarily in
economic activity. The key questions here would be: (i) What kind of activity
can copyright users (e.g., broadcasters, online aggregators, consumers) in each
country undertake under collective licences? (ii) How are these activities
priced? (iii) How are the licence fees distributed between the various right
holders (intermediaries and creators)?
To give a few examples: blanket licences (musical works) for commercial
radio stations are typically set at a percentage (often 2/o-3/o) of revenue.
Blanket licences (musical works) for CDs are set as a percentage of the
wholesale price (6/6-9% of the published price to the dealer). Blanket
licences/levies for private copying may be set as a percentage of the retail price
(50/) of copying equipment/media. Blanket licences for course readers at
universities may be priced as a fixed fee per student."9
Since contracts over copyright materials may now be formed simultaneously
on the supply side and the demand side (user-generated content) or be
negotiated as bundles (ISPs/mobile services), it would be desirable to pursue
such a research agenda in an integrated manner. How is the role of
intermediaries changing? Can predictions of disintermediation be
substantiated? To what degree can contracts substitute for copyright protection
at all points along the value chain? Are developments sector specific? Such a
and mobile use.
118 Methodologically, this may be done by looking at areas in which copyright law does not
define what is being sold, such as TV formats, jokes, recipes or fashion. See Loshin, supra note 12;
Fauchart & von Hippel, supra note 12; Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 12; Decherney,
supra note 12; Kretschmer, Singh & Wardle, supra note 12.
119 The percentages/fixed fees vary greatly between activities and between countries. In
countries with a Copyright Board, such as Canada, there is an extensive jurisprudence on the
setting of tariffs (when they have been challenged). To our knowledge there is no tradition of
jurisprudence on the distribution of these fees (e.g., between various categories of rights, between
authors and publishers, between major and minor earners, thresholds) although some countries
set certain elements by law (for example in relation to the private copy levy).
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larger project is likely to be interdisciplinary, using multiple methods, and may
subsume several of the research priorities identified above.
VII. CONCLUDING THOUGHT
This "supply side" analysis of the relationship between copyright and
contract law has questioned the frequently made argument that copyright (in
the words of Lord Macaulay) "is a tax on readers for the purpose of giving a
bounty to writers." 20 It turns out, rather, that the bounty to authors is a
function of the contracts authors conclude with publishers and producers, not
necessarily of the exclusivity enforced against copyright users-and empirically
it is a bounty for the few, not the many. Copyright policy has ignored, or
misunderstood, the role of contracts in effecting or subverting policy aims. It
can no longer do so.
120 Speech of 5 February 1841 in the House of Commons; Parliamentary Debates on the
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